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Faculty and Deans

When Can a State Be Sued?
William Van Alstyne
In her Popular Government article “When You
Can’t Sue the State: State
Sovereign Immunity”
(Summer 2000), Anita R.
Brown-Graham described
a series of recent decisions
in which a sharply divided
U.S. Supreme Court
barred individuals from
suing states for money
damages for certain violations of federal law, such as
laws prohibiting discrimination against employees
because of their age. In
the response that follows,
William Van Alstyne
argues that this barrier to
relief is neither unduly

imposing nor novel. The
debate over the significance of these decisions
is likely to continue. In
February 2001, in another
case decided by a fiveto-four vote (Board of
Trustees of University of
Alabama v. Garrett), the
Supreme Court again
barred an individual’s suit
for damages against a
state entity, this time for a
violation of the Americans
with Disabilities Act.
— Editor
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rofessor Anita Brown-Graham’s welcome
and comprehensive article (“When You
Can’t Sue the State”) was first-rate. Even so,
it may leave readers with a somewhat misleading
impression of what has happened recently. If one
rephrases the title merely to turn the question
around (“When Can a State Be Sued?”), one will
see that the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent Eleventh
Amendment decisions overall may do less in securing state immunity from suits brought under
various federal statutes, in federal courts, than one
might first suppose.

P

I
First, as Professor Brown-Graham acknowledged, with respect to all of the various state
entities otherwise covered by the federal statutes
touched on in her article, each remains subject
to federal court suit by any federal enforcement
agency authorized by Congress to pursue it,
whether or not in federal court. That any such
action may seek money damages (and not merely
injunctive relief), moreover, does not affect the
jurisdiction of the court.1
Second, as Professor Brown-Graham likewise
acknowledged, even as to federal court enforcement actions brought by private parties (rather
than by a federal agency such as the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission or the
Department of Labor), private parties may still
sue to halt any ongoing violations, merely substituting the state agency head (by name) as the
defendant and shifting from seeking damages to
demanding injunctive relief.2
Third, insofar as any of the federal statutes are
grounded on the enforcement clause of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, or Fifteenth Amendment,
then even private actions against the state or state
agency, seeking money damages (including punitive damages as well as attorney fees), may be
brought in federal court, as provided by Congress.
The author is Perkins Professor of Constitutional
Law, Duke University School of Law. Contact him
at WVA@law.duke.edu.
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The Equal Pay Act of 1963 provides for money
damages (actually, double liquidated damages
plus attorney fees). As Professor Brown-Graham
herself noticed, this act has been upheld in authorizing not merely effective injunctive relief but
specified money damages as well. And so it is,
equally, with any other act of Congress that can
claim a valid basis in any of the enforcement
clauses of these amendments.3
Fourth, insofar as some federal statutes are
not based on any of the Civil War amendment
enforcement clauses (and not all are), still, insofar as they may be tied to federal funds (as many
assuredly are), the Supreme Court has held that
Congress can make state or state agency acceptance of statutory provisions authorizing private
actions for money damages to be brought against
them in federal court an express condition of
funding eligibility. Having thus accepted the bitter with the sweet (albeit under considerable real
duress of otherwise being excluded from funding
eligibility), the receiving state is bound by its
waiver of immunity and liable to answer even to
privately brought suits for money damages in
federal court.4
Fifth, as acknowledged (but somewhat downplayed in the article), it also remains true that state
officials may be sued personally in federal court,
in privately brought actions seeking money damages from them, should they act in disregard of
specific provisions in some federal acts. Why? Because neither state nor local officials acquire any
personal immunity by force of the Eleventh
Amendment.5
Sixth, of significance to many readers of
Popular Government, most local government
units (e.g., cities, counties, and school districts)
generally receive no Eleventh Amendment immunity at all. So they have no shield to raise against
private claims for money damages sought from
them under the various applicable federal laws,
whether or not in federal court.6 None of the
Supreme Court’s recent decisions have effected
any change in this respect.
The net effect of all these considerations may

Nor are the principal recent Eleventh Amendment
decisions nearly as novel or precedent-shattering
as they have been made to seem by their critics
(e.g., those quoted in Professor Brown-Graham’s
article). The point merits some emphasis in its
own right.
More than a century ago, the Supreme Court
noted that when the Constitution itself was
under discussion, in the founding period, “[a]ny
. . . power as that of authorizing the federal judiciary to entertain [money damages] suits by individuals against the States [without their consent],
had been expressly disclaimed . . . by the great
defenders of the Constitution.”7 And so the law
generally stood for most of our constitutional
history, right up until 1989.
Indeed, not until 1989, in Pennsylvania v.
Union Gas,8 did the Court presume to declare
that, other than pursuant to acts of Congress
derived from the Civil War amendments, private
parties could generally sue states without their
consent, in federal courts, for money damages,
whenever Congress might think it suitable to treat
states no differently than private parties in this
respect. Readers of Popular Government may not
now remember, but it was actually just this decision, Union Gas, that was “revisionist.” A thin
majority of justices in Union Gas presumed to
overturn virtually two centuries of established
Article III and Eleventh Amendment constitutional immunity previously acknowledged by the
Court. In turn, it was merely just this decision,
and not some more ancient precedent, that was
repudiated by a bare majority of the Court itself,
in 1996, in Seminole Tribe v. Florida.9

Notes
1. In brief, even as the Supreme Court has
said all along, the Eleventh Amendment provides
no immunity from suits against the states in
federal courts when they are brought by, or on
behalf of, the national government as such.
2. See, e.g., Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123
(1908); Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho,
521 U.S. 261 (1997).
3. As the Court itself has noted, these
amendments (the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and
Fifteenth) were added to the Constitution in
the aftermath of the Civil War. They were
added, moreover, as new, express restrictions
on the states as such. And each explicitly pro-

III
In fact, it may be more strongly arguable that in
recent decades, Congress has presumed to burden state and local governments with more
restrictions (and more affirmative duties) than
historically Congress imagined it had any authority to do. And far from intervening against Congress’s ever-expanding claims of power over the
states in any general way, for the most part the
Supreme Court has merely acquiesced.10 In turn,
as against this general trend, the overall effects of
the Court’s recent Tenth and Eleventh Amendment
“immunity” decisions are rather puny countermeasures, such as they are. They are, in brief, far
less like impassable roadblocks placed in Congress’s pathway (as it presumes to sweep its way
through and over the states by imposing ever
more restrictions, costs, and liabilities upon them)
than like mere “traffic bumps” along the federal
juggernaut road.11

In February 2001 the
U.S. Supreme Court
ruled that individuals
could not sue states
for money damages
for violations of the
Americans with
Disabilities Act. Earlier
the Court ruled
similarly regarding the
Age Discrimination in
Employment Act.

vided an express power in Congress—that is,
a power to “enforce” these new restrictions
on the states “by appropriate legislation.”
Each of these clauses (Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment, Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment) is later in time than the
Eleventh Amendment. That they were meant
to, and did, empower Congress to provide
redress through civil actions, including appropriate federal court actions for money damages (and not merely for injunctive relief), as
Congress might decide to do, is surely exactly
as one would logically suppose.
4. To be sure, as Professor Brown-Graham
correctly indicated, the Court requires that
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II

Essentially, then, except for this short interval
(1989–96), the general position of the Supreme
Court respecting the scope of Article III and
Eleventh Amendment immunity of the states was
pretty much as the Court has once again said it
is, neither more nor less. And as we have seen in
the course of this brief review, that immunity
(such as it is) is effectively quite a bit less, as a
practical matter, than it has been made to appear.
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in fact be this: as with reports of Mark Twain’s
death, the overall effect of the Court’s recent
Eleventh Amendment decisions may have been
considerably exaggerated. It is less than one
might have supposed.

Congress be forthright if it means to qualify a
state’s (or state agency’s) eligibility for some
category of federal aid by its willingness to
answer to private parties in damages in federal
court for failing to adhere to the terms of the
statute. But this is merely a requirement of
“plain statement” by Congress, nothing more.
5. Since the action neither is brought
against the state as such nor seeks damages
from the state [rather, from the personal savings
and assets of the named individual defendant(s)],
nothing in the Eleventh Amendment bars the
action from proceeding in federal court.
6. More than a century ago, the Supreme
Court held that cities (“municipal corporations”) and counties (and frequently, school
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districts) cannot invoke or “borrow” a state’s
Eleventh Amendment immunity to shield their
assets from federal court civil actions brought
against them by private parties. See, e.g.,
Mount Healthy City School District Bd. v.
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977); Lincoln County
v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890).
7. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 12 (1890).
See also Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 120
S. Ct. 631, 640 (2000), O’Connor, J., concurring (“[F]or over a century now, we have
made clear that the Constitution does not provide for federal jurisdiction over suits against
nonconsenting States”).
8. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, 491 U.S. 1
(1989).
9. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44
(1996).
10. Here’s but one example. The Fair Labor
Standards Act, referred to in Professor BrownGraham’s article, was adopted in 1936 (during
the New Deal), pursuant to the power vested
in Congress to “regulate commerce . . . among
the states.” The act applied in a far-reaching
manner, to be sure. It did so by decreeing the
minimum wage to be paid not only by businesses engaged in interstate commerce (enterprises competing in national and foreign commerce) but also by more local (intrastate)
commercial enterprises. Even so, Congress
also carefully abstained from imposing any
such demands on ordinary state and local government units as such. Congress readily recognized that these government units were not
commercial entities, nor were they conducting
themselves as though they were. In Congress’s
own understanding, that is, a state, or county,
or city that merely devotes some fraction of
state and local taxes to defray the expense of
providing local parks or other local service
(e.g., ordinary police and fire protection) was
not “engaged in commerce” as such, according
to any plausible or common understanding of
that term. Nearly forty years later, however, in
1974, Congress brushed away its previous sense
of self-restraint. Accordingly it abandoned its
own previous understanding and presumed to
treat the states as in no respect different from
a mere for-profit, privately owned business
enterprise, claiming a power to regulate them
quite as much as it had already regulated ordinary business enterprises. This was a breathtaking step. At first, the Supreme Court balked
[National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S.
833 (1976)], only to reverse itself within a
decade [Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 28 (1985)], thus sanctioning a scope of congressional power over
the states that even the New Deal Congress
had never supposed it possessed.
11. As some readers of POPULAR
GOVERNMENT may know, moreover, even
these mere traffic bumps, such as they are, are
now at risk. If there is replacement on the
Court of a single vote, depending (of course)
on whose it might be, they may be razed.
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